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Abstract 
Did the 2016 U.S. presidential election’s outcome affect Americans’ expression of 
gender bias? Drawing on theories linking leadership with intergroup attitudes, we proposed it 
would. A pre-registered exploratory survey of two independent samples of Americans pre- 
and post-election (Ns=1,098 and 1,192) showed no pre-post differences in modern sexism, 
concern with the gender pay gap, or perceptions of gender inequality and progress overall. 
However, supporters of Donald Trump (but not of Hillary Clinton) expressed greater modern 
sexism post- versus pre-election – which in turn predicted reporting lower disturbance with 
the gender pay gap, perceiving less discrimination against women but more against men, 
greater progress toward gender equality, and greater female representation at top levels in the 
U.S. Results were reliable when evaluated against four robustness standards, thereby offering 
suggestive evidence of how historic events may affect gender-bias expression. We discuss the 
theoretical implications for intergroup attitudes and their expression. 
 
Word Count: 148 
 
Keywords: election, Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, gender bias, sexism, intergroup 
relations  
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An Exploratory Investigation of Americans’ Expression of Gender Bias 
Before and After the 2016 Presidential Election 
 The 2016 U.S. presidential election sparked intense debate about gender bias. 
Americans questioned what the first nomination of a woman candidate from a major party 
signalled in terms of gender bias in society, whether the media treated Hillary Clinton 
differently because of her gender, and whether certain comments from Donald Trump 
reflected sexism. Such debate raised the question: What effect, if any, would the 2016 
presidential election outcome have on the degree to which Americans express gender bias?  
The present research explores this question, examining gender bias as expressed 
through the acceptance and justification of gender inequality (Jost & Kay, 2005; Swim, 
Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). By investigating gender-bias expression before and after a one-
time historic event, we advance theoretical understandings of factors that may shape bias 
expression beyond both intra-individual and interpersonal predictors identified in the 
intergroup-relations literature (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske & North, 2015; Swim, 
Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001), and cultural factors described by cross-cultural 
perspectives (Glick et al., 2000).  
Why would a one-time historic event like a national election influence gender-bias 
expression, given that changing intergroup attitudes is difficult (Devine, 1989; Nosek et al., 
2007), and requires targeted interventions (Cundiff, Zawadzki, Danube, & Shields, 2014; 
Kilmartin et al., 2008) or repeated interactions (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004)? Theories linking 
leadership with intergroup attitudes have proposed that authority figures and leaders 
powerfully influence their ingroup members’ social attitudes (Allport, 1954; Hogg, 2001; 
Sherif, 1962). Drawing on this perspective, we suggest that historic events that elevate a 
leader (e.g., a popular election) could trigger sense-making processes (Higgins & Bargh, 
1987; Tankard & Paluck, 2017) that shape bias expression (Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; 
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Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006; Norton & Sommers, 2011). More specifically, Americans may 
have looked to the 2016 election’s outcome to inform their perceptions and attitudes about 
gender in society. Some research indeed suggested that the election of Barack Obama 
reduced implicit racial bias (Columb & Plant, 2011; Plant et al., 2009; but see Skinner & 
Cheadle, 2016), although other work suggested it weakened support for redressing racial 
inequality (Kaiser, Drury, Spalding, Cheryan, & O’Brien, 2009), and that endorsing Obama 
could license people to subsequently favor Whites over Blacks (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 
2009). These studies could have informed predictions about how the election of America’s 
first female President would affect gender-bias expression, but cannot inform predictions 
about the effect of Donald Trump’s victory.  
To explore how gender-bias expression might have changed following the election, 
we recruited two independent samples of Americans several days before and after the 
election. Because people may have different psychological responses to elections depending 
on whether their preferred candidate wins, we explored whether the results depended on the 
candidate people supported. Our primary outcome measure was modern sexism – a subtle, 
contemporary form of gender bias that involves denying the existence of gender 
discrimination in society, dismissing women’s demands, and resenting them for purportedly 
receiving special favors (Swim et al., 1995). The modern sexism scale is well-suited to 
detecting subtle shifts in gender bias because people are more willing to express it than 
hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), which assesses overtly prejudiced negative attitudes 
toward women (Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa, & Stangor, 2005). Moreover, modern sexism 
assesses perceptions of women and gender in society, and could thus more plausibly be 
influenced by society-level events (like elections) than measures capturing sexism in intimate 
relationships (but see Ratliff, Redford, Conway, & Smith, 2017).  
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We also conceptualized modern sexism as an antecedent to a variety of gender-bias 
outcomes, following previous work (for a review, see Fiske & North, 2015). For example, 
past research shows that modern sexism predicts poorer detection of sexism in one’s day-to-
day environment (Swim et al., 2005), inflated perceptions of women’s advancement in 
traditionally male-dominated fields (Swim et al., 1995), and lower support for women’s 
political movements (Becker & Wagner, 2009; Campbell, Schellenberg, & Senn, 1997). We 
thus examined whether modern sexism would predict outcomes relevant to the national 
conversation about gender at the time of the election: disturbance with a concrete instance of 
gender discrimination (the gender pay gap), beliefs about the prevalence of gender 
discrimination against women and men, perceptions of progress toward gender equality, and 
perceptions of female representation in top political and business positions. Given our interest 
in whether the election would affect modern sexism, and the theoretical reasons for expecting 
modern sexism to predict these other outcomes, we explored whether the election, through 
modern sexism, could indirectly affect these outcomes. 
We wrote an internal pre-registration1 specifying the targeted sample size, all 
measures, and methods. We pre-registered directional hypotheses about how our measures 
might shift after a Clinton win, because these predictions directly followed from past 
research. We did not formulate hypotheses about the consequences of Trump’s election, as 
previous literature did not clearly suggest directional predictions. Given the election outcome, 
our investigation is exploratory. 
Method 
Design 
The study has a quasi-experimental, between-subjects, pre-post design. We surveyed 
different participants pre- and post-election because surveying the same participants twice (a 
                                                          
1 Uploaded on OSF: https://osf.io/vb637/?view_only=d94baaceee89426b8c95f0085f41bfdc 
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within-subjects design) could have resulted in high attrition levels, revealed our interest in the 
election (i.e., create demand characteristics), and pressured participants to provide consistent 
responses pre- and post-election. We describe robustness checks to ensure the pre- and post-
election samples are comparable (e.g., on demographics), which helps address potential third-
variable concerns. 
Participants 
We hired Survey Sampling International to recruit two independent samples of 
American adults around the November 8th, 2016 Election Day (pre-election: November 4 – 
November 8 early morning EST; post-election: November 9 EST evening – November 15). 
Based on a power analysis, we requested 1,200 unique participants. Even in case of 
substantial attrition, this offers adequate power to detect a small effect of the election (e.g., n 
= 930 per sample provides 80% power to detect d = 0.13 at p < 0.05).  
We initially set quotas for equal numbers of women and men, and an approximately-
proportionate distribution of ethnic groups based on U.S. Census Bureau (2011) estimates – 
63.7% Non-Hispanic Whites, 12.2% Non-Hispanic Blacks, 4.7% Non-Hispanic Asians, 
16.3% Hispanics or Latinos, and 3.0% others – but relaxed the ethnicity quota in the final 
hours to meet targeted sample sizes within the timeline (see Supplementary Online Material, 
SOM, for demographics). Only U.S.-based Americans (indicated by self-reported citizenship 
and IP address) who consented and, for the post-election survey, had not already completed 
the pre-election survey, participated.  
Prior to analysis, we excluded participants who failed either of two attention checks 
(pre-registered), provided incomplete responses, or took less than one-third of the median 
time to complete the study (lab-standard practice)2, leaving N = 2,290 people (pre-election: 
npre-election = 1,098; MAge = 33.87, SD = 16.63; 531 men, 564 women, 3 other gender; 747 
                                                          
2 The results’ direction and significance level were unchanged when retaining too-fast responses. 
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European Americans, 157 African Americans, 55 Asian Americans, 97 Hispanic or Latino 
Americans, 42 other race; post-election: npost-election = 1,192, MAge = 33.39, SDAge = 17.13; 567 
men, 625 women; 807 European Americans, 161 African Americans, 59 Asian Americans, 
113 Hispanic or Latino Americans, 52 other race). 
Procedure 
Participants provided demographics, answered an attention check, and completed the 
measures below (in which a second attention check was embedded). At the end of the survey, 
pre-election participants indicated how closely they had followed the election and whether 
they were registered to vote in the U.S.; post-election participants instead answered these 
questions at the survey’s start to increase the election’s salience. 
Measures 
 We compared pre- and post-election responses on the following measures (see Table 
1 for descriptive statistics and correlations).  
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Table 1. Correlations among, and descriptive statistics for, the outcome variables measured. 
 
Outcome 
variables 
 
 
M (SD) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
1. Modern 
Sexism 
2.52 
(0.86) 
 -0.62 
*** 
-0.68 
*** 
0.23 
*** 
0.72 
*** 
0.31 
*** 
2. Disturbance 
with the gender 
pay gap 
5.35 
(1.62) 
  0.54 
*** 
-0.26 
*** 
-0.57 
*** 
-0.08 
*** 
3. Perceptions 
of gender 
discrimination 
against women 
6.78 
(2.09) 
   0.03 
 
  -0.63 
*** 
-0.05 
* 
4. Perceptions 
of gender 
discrimination 
against men 
3.99 
(2.19) 
    0.21 
*** 
0.23 
*** 
5. Perceptions 
of progress 
towards gender 
equality 
3.81 
(1.09) 
     0.16 
*** 
6. Perceived 
female 
representation 
at top levels 
29.97% 
(18.75%) 
      
Note. N = 2,290. *** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, † = p < 0.10.  
 
 
Modern sexism. As noted, we focused on gender bias expressed through the 
acceptance or justification of gender inequality, operationalized with the eight-item Modern 
Sexism Scale (Swim et al., 1995; α = 0.87). Modern sexism, although unidimensional, 
captures gender bias in the guise of the denial of ongoing discrimination against women (e.g., 
“Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States”, reverse-scored), 
antagonism toward women’s demands (e.g., “It is easy to understand the anger of women’s 
groups in America”), and resentment about purported special favors for women in society 
(e.g., “Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more 
concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women’s actual experiences”, 
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reverse-scored). Higher numbers indicate greater modern sexism (1 “Strongly agree” to 5 
“Strongly disagree”).   
Because modern sexism predicts a range of consequential gender-bias-related 
outcomes (Fiske and North, 2015; also see Georgeac & Rattan, 2018), we also conceptualized 
it as a potential mediator of indirect effects on the following measures.  
Disturbance with the gender pay gap. Participants indicated how disturbed they felt 
by each of six factual statistics about the gender pay gap (e.g., “across all jobs, women who 
work full-time earn 78 cents for every dollar a man earns for the same work”; 1 “Not at all 
disturbed” to 7 “Extremely disturbed”; α = 0.97; Georgeac & Rattan, 2018; full scale in SOM 
Appendix). 
Perceptions of gender discrimination against women and men. Participants 
indicated how much they thought women and men were “the victims of discrimination in the 
United States these days,” using separate 10-point scales for each gender (1 “Not at all” to 10 
“Very much”; adapted from Norton & Sommers, 2011). We analysed each item separately. 
Perceptions of progress toward gender equality. Four items assessed perceived 
progress toward gender equality in the U.S. (e.g., “How much improvement has there been in 
equality for women in the U.S. in the last 10 years?”; 4 items; α = 0.74; adapted from 
Brodish, Brazy, & Devine, 2008). Higher numbers indicate greater perceived progress toward 
gender equality (e.g., 1 “Little improvement” to 7 “A lot of improvement”).  
 Perceived female representation at top levels. Participants estimated the percentage 
(on a slider scale of 1% increments) of women “in the top levels of U.S. politics (the 
President, the Vice President, the Cabinet, Congress, governors, and others at the top of the 
leadership hierarchy in the government),” and “in the top levels of U.S. organizations (CEOs, 
Boards of Directors, Senior Vice Presidents, and others at the top of the leadership hierarchy 
2016 ELECTION & GENDER BIAS 10 
in the workplace)” (Georgeac & Rattan, 2018). The two items were highly correlated (r = 
0.80, p < 0.001) and averaged.  
We expected modern sexism to predict feeling less disturbed about the gender pay 
gap, and perceiving less discrimination toward women, more discrimination toward men, 
more progress toward gender equality, and greater female representation at top levels of 
society.  
Potential moderator: Candidate support. We also assessed whether the election’s 
effect would depend on the candidate supported. We categorized people as supporting Trump 
(npre-election = 351; npost-election = 432) or Clinton (npre-election = 622; npost-election = 605) based on 
whom they planned to vote for (in the pre-election survey) or had voted for (in both surveys).  
Finally, participants provided additional demographics (see SOM) and reported their 
political ideology (-3 = “Extremely liberal” to +3 = “Extremely conservative”).  
Results 
Participant gender did not significantly moderate any of the following results (see 
SOM).  
No Main Effect of Survey Time  
The timing of the survey (pre- versus post-election) had no significant main effects on 
the dependent measures, |ts| ≤ 1.60, ps ≥ 0.11, ds ≤ 0.07 (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Comparison of pre- versus post-election samples across variables measured. 
 
Outcome variables 
Pre-election 
M 
(SD) 
Post-election 
M 
(SD) 
Mean 
difference 
(SE) 
95% CI  
t 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Cohen’s 
d Lower bound 
Upper 
bound 
1. Modern Sexism 2.50 (0.83) 
2.54 
(0.88) 
0.04 
(0.04) -0.03 0.11 1.21 2288 0.23 0.05 
2. Disturbance with 
the gender pay gap 
5.34 
(1.57) 
5.35 
(1.66) 
0.01 
(0.07) -0.12 0.14 0.14 2288 0.89 0.01 
3. Perceptions of 
gender discrimination 
against women 
6.80 
(2.02) 
6.76 
(2.15) 
-0.04 
(0.09) -0.21 0.13 -0.48 2287.16 0.63 0.02 
4. Perceptions of 
gender discrimination 
against men 
3.91 
(2.15) 
4.06 
(2.23) 
0.15 
(0.09) -0.03 0.33 1.60 2288 0.11 0.07 
5. Perceptions of 
progress towards 
gender equality 
3.80 
(1.05) 
3.82 
(1.13) 
0.02 
(0.05) -0.07 0.11 0.36 2287.98 0.72 0.02 
6. Perceived female 
representation at top 
levels 
29.84% 
(18.57%) 
30.08% 
(18.93%) 
0.24% 
(0.78%) -1.30% 1.78% 0.30 2288 0.76 0.01 
Note. N = 2,290. Where df are not a whole number, the test does not assume equality of variances. 
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Different Effects of Survey Time for Clinton versus Trump Supporters 
The following analyses have a smaller sample size (N = 2,010; npre-election = 973, npost-
election  = 1,037) because some participants supported alternative candidates or reported they 
would not or did not vote (see SOM, Table S1 for Ms and SDs). 
Modern sexism. A 2 X 2 ANOVA yielded a significant Survey time X Candidate 
support interaction, F(1, 2006) = 6.25, p = 0.012, 𝜂𝑝2  = 0.003 (see Table 3). Trump supporters 
endorsed modern sexism significantly more post-election, MPre = 2.93, SD = 0.80, MPost = 
3.05, SD = 0.81, F(1, 2006) = 4.27, p = 0.039, 𝜂𝑝2  = 0.002, 95% CI [0.01; 0.23], whereas 
Clinton supporters did not, MPre = 2.26, SD = 0.76, MPost = 2.20, SD = 0.77, F(1, 2006) = 
2.02, p = 0.16, 𝜂𝑝2  = 0.001, 95% CI [-0.15; 0.02].  
Perceptions of gender discrimination against women and men. Candidate support 
also significantly moderated the effect of survey time on perceived discrimination against 
women, F(1, 2006) = 4.47, p = 0.035, 𝜂𝑝2  = 0.002 (see Table 3). Whereas Clinton supporters 
reported perceiving significantly more discrimination against women post-election, MPre = 
7.36, SD = 1.77, MPost = 7.59, SD = 1.74, F(1, 2006) = 4.56, p = 0.033, 𝜂𝑝2  = 0.002,  95% CI 
[0.02; 0.45], Trump supporters did not, MPre = 5.77, SD = 2.08, MPost = 5.63, SD = 2.19, F(1, 
2006) = 1.01, p = 0.32, 𝜂𝑝2 = 0.001, 95% CI [-0.41; 0.13]. This finding is consistent with a 
concurrent investigation (Does, Gündemir, & Shih, in press). 
Whereas only Trump supporters expressed greater modern sexism post-election, only 
Clinton supporters perceived greater discrimination against women post-election. Given the 
negative correlation between modern sexism and perceived discrimination of women (r = -
0.68, p < 0.001), these two effects appear complementary. 
The survey time by candidate support interaction was not significant for any other 
measure, Fs ≤ 2.29, ps ≥ 0.13, 𝜂𝑝2 ≤ 0.001 (see Table 3). However, it is possible this 
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interaction had a theoretically-meaningful indirect effect on these measures through modern 
sexism (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011), which we test next.
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Table 3. Tests of Survey time x Candidate support interactions on each of the outcome variables, and corresponding simple slopes. 
 
Outcome 
variables 
  Pre-election 
M  
(SD) 
Post-election 
M  
(SD) 
Mean 
difference 
(SE) 
95% CI  
F 
 
p 
 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  
 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
1. Modern 
Sexism 
Survey time       0.54 0.46 < 0.001 
Candidate 
support 
      451.05 < 0.001 0.18 
Interaction       6.25 0.012 0.003 
 Simple slopes analysis 
Donald 
Trump 
supporters 
2.93 
(0.80) 
3.05 
(0.81) 
0.12 
(0.06) 
0.01 0.23 
4.27 0.039 0.002 
  
Hillary 
Clinton 
supporters 
2.26 
(0.76) 
2.20 
(0.77) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.15 0.02 
2.02 0.16 0.001 
2. Disturbance 
with the 
gender pay 
gap 
Survey time       0.10 0.76 < 0.001 
Candidate 
support 
      247.44 < 0.001 0.11 
Interaction       0.33 0.57 < 0.001 
Note. N = 2,010. All between-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 1, and all within-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 2,006. 
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Table 3 Continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 2,010. All between-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 1, and all within-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 2,006. 
   
 
Outcome 
variables 
  Pre-election 
M  
(SD) 
Post-election 
M  
(SD) 
Mean 
difference 
(SE) 
95% CI  
F 
 
p 𝜼𝒑𝟐  
 
 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
3. Perceptions 
of gender 
discrimination 
against 
women 
Survey time       0.30 0.59 < 0.001 
Candidate 
support 
      407.48 < 0.001 0.17 
Interaction       4.47 0.035 0.002 
 Simple slopes analysis 
Donald 
Trump 
supporters 
5.77 
(2.08) 
5.63 
(2.19) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.41 0.13 
1.01 0.32 0.001 
  
Hillary 
Clinton 
supporters 
7.36 
(1.77) 
7.59 
(1.74) 
0.23 
(0.11) 
0.02 0.45 
4.56 0.033 0.002 
4. Perceptions 
of gender 
discrimination 
against men 
Survey time 
      4.11 0.043 0.002 
Candidate 
support 
      27.59 < 0.001 0.014 
Interaction 
      0.54 0.46 < 0.001 
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Table 3 Continued. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. N = 2,010. All between-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 1, and all within-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 2,006.
 
Outcome 
variables 
  Pre-election 
M  
(SD) 
Post-election 
M  
(SD) 
Mean 
difference 
(SE) 
95% CI  
F 
 
p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  
 
 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
5. Perceptions 
of progress 
towards 
gender 
equality 
Survey time       0.70 0.40 < 0.001 
Candidate 
support 
      421.73 < 0.001 0.17 
Interaction       2.29 0.13 0.001 
6. Perceived 
female 
representation 
at top levels 
 
Survey time       0.01 0.93 < 0.001 
Candidate 
support 
      4.36 0.037 0.002 
Interaction       1.43 0.23 0.001 
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Potential Consequences of Modern Sexism as a Function of Survey Time and Candidate 
Support 
 Confirmatory factor analysis. We first tested whether modern sexism represents a 
distinct construct from the other measures. Suggesting it does, modern sexism loaded onto a 
different factor from the other measures in a confirmatory factor analysis (see SOM). It was 
thus informative to test whether modern sexism mediated any indirect effects of survey time 
on the other measures.  
Indirect effects of survey time through modern sexism. A meaningful conditional 
indirect effect can arise in the absence of a significant total effect (e.g., due to power or 
suppression effects; Rucker et al., 2011; Shrout & Bolger, 2002; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 
2010). We thus examined indirect effects conditional on candidate support, using a 
moderated mediation analysis. Specifically, we tested whether an indirect effect from survey 
time (X), via modern sexism endorsement (M), to each of the other outcomes (Y) depended 
on candidate support (W), which could moderate the X-M link or the X-Y link (see Figure 1; 
Model 8 in Hayes, 2013). We effect-coded survey time (pre-election=-1; post-election=1) and 
candidate support (Clinton=-1; Trump=1), and mean-centered the mediator, modern sexism. 
The coefficients reported below are indirect effects and their bias-corrected, bootstrapped 
95% CIs, computed with 10,000 resamples using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model for the conditional process analyses conducted (corresponding to Model 8 in 
Hayes (2013)). 
 
A-path 
 
X 
Survey time 
M 
Modern Sexism 
Y 
Outcome variables 
W 
Candidate support 
B-path 
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 For each of the five outcome variables, the indirect effect from survey time via 
modern sexism endorsement was significantly larger for Trump supporters than for Clinton 
supporters, as indicated by significant indices of moderated mediation (see Table 4). 
Specifically, Trump supporters’ greater modern sexism endorsement post-election predicted 
less disturbance with the gender pay gap, b = -0.06, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.12; -0.003], lower 
perceived discrimination against women, b = -0.09, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.17; -0.004], higher 
perceived discrimination against men, b = 0.03, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.002; 0.07], greater 
perceived progress toward equality for women, b = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.002; 0.10], 
and greater perceived female representation at top levels in the U.S., b = 0.45, SE = 0.23, 
95% CI [0.02; 0.92].  
No indirect effects were significant for Clinton supporters, |bs| ≤ 0.25 (see Table 4), 
because as noted, survey time did not significantly predict Clinton supporters’ expressed 
modern sexism.  
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Table 4. Results of the moderated mediation analyses, IV = Survey time, W = Candidate support, M = Modern Sexism (mean-centered). 
Outcome 
variables 
Sub-sample  A path B path 
 
Indirect effect 
 
Direct effect Difference in 
indirect effects 
(Index of moderated 
mediation) 
1. Disturbance 
with the gender 
pay gap 
Trump supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
0.06 
(0.03) 
[0.003; 0.113] 
0.039 
-1.06 
(0.04) 
[-1.132; -0.992] 
< 0.001 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
[-0.122; -0.003] 
0.05 
(0.05) 
[-0.036; 0.141] 
0.24 
-0.10 
(0.04) 
[-0.171; -0.020] 
 Clinton supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
[-0.075; 0.012] 
0.16 
-1.06 
(0.04) 
[-1.132; -0.992] 
< 0.001 
0.03 
(0.02) 
[-0.012; 0.080] 
-0.003 
(0.04) 
[-0.073; 0.067] 
0.93 
2. Perceptions 
of gender 
discrimination 
against women 
Trump supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
0.06 
(0.03) 
[0.003; 0.113] 
0.039 
-1.48 
(0.04) 
[-1.565; -1.394] 
< 0.001 
-0.09 
(0.04) 
[-0.171; -0.004] 
 
0.02 
(0.05) 
[-0.091; 0.124] 
0.76 
 
 
-0.13 
(0.05) 
[-0.240; -0.029] 
 
 
 
 
Clinton supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
[-0.075; 0.012] 
0.16 
-1.48 
(0.04) 
[-1.565; -1.394] 
< 0.001 
0.05 
(0.03) 
[-0.016; 0.111] 
0.07 
(0.04) 
[-0.016; -0.155] 
0.11 
3. Perceptions 
of gender 
discrimination 
against men 
Trump supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
0.06 
(0.03) 
[0.003; 0.113] 
0.039 
0.59 
(0.06) 
[0.475; 0.714] 
< 0.001 
0.03 
(0.02) 
[0.002; 0.071] 
0.10 
(0.08) 
[-0.047; 0.255] 
0.18 0.05 
(0.02) 
[0.012; 0.099] 
 Clinton supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
[-0.075; 0.012] 
0.16 
0.59 
(0.06) 
[0.475; 0.714] 
< 0.001 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
[-0.046; 0.006] 
0.08 
(0.06) 
[-0.360; 0.203] 
0.17 
Note. The A and B paths refer to the paths depicted in Figure 1. N = 2,010. Confidence intervals (CIs) were computed with the bias-corrected 
bootstrap method with 10,000 resamples. 
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Table 4 Continued. 
Outcome 
variables 
Sub-sample  A path B path 
 
Indirect effect 
 
Direct effect Difference in 
indirect effects 
(Index of moderated 
mediation) 
4. Perceptions 
of progress 
towards gender 
equality 
Trump supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
0.06 
(0.03) 
[0.003; 0.113] 
0.039 
0.82 
(0.02) 
[0.781; 0.865] 
< 0.001 
0.05 
(0.02) 
[0.002; 0.095] 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
[-0.085; 0.020] 
0.23 
 
 
 
0.07 
(0.03) 
[0.016; 0.134] 
 
 
 
 Clinton supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
[-0.075; 0.012] 
0.16 
0.82 
(0.02) 
[0.781; 0.865] 
< 0.001 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
[-0.062; 0.009] 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
[-0.069; 0.015] 
0.21 
5. Perceived 
female 
representation 
at top levels 
Trump supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
0.06 
(0.03) 
[0.003; 0.113] 
0.039 
7.81 
(0.52) 
[6.789; 8.829] 
< 0.001 
0.45 
(0.23) 
[0.023; 0.916] 
0.11 
(0.65) 
[-1.172; 1.393] 
0.87 
 
 
 
0.70 
(0.29) 
[0.158; 1.308] 
 
 
 
 
 
 Clinton supporters b 
(SE) 
95% CI 
p 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
[-0.075; 0.012] 
0.16 
7.81 
(0.52) 
[6.789; 8.829] 
< 0.001 
-0.25 
(0.17) 
[-0.599; 0.085] 
-0.24 
(0.52) 
[-1.261; 0.776] 
0.64 
Note. The A and B paths refer to the paths depicted in Figure 1. N = 2,010. Confidence intervals (CIs) were computed with the bias-corrected 
bootstrap method with 10,000 resamples. 
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Critically Evaluating Exploratory Findings With Robustness Checks 
Exploratory correlational research must be evaluated against strong standards of 
robustness if any insights are to be drawn. Therefore, we conducted robustness checks to 
address potential concerns regarding (1) the choice of moderator, (2) selection bias across the 
pre- and post-election samples, and (3) multiple hypothesis testing.  
(1) Choice of moderator. Our main analyses focused on candidate support as a 
moderator. Candidate support ought to overlap with political ideology; indeed, more-
conservative participants tended to support Trump in our sample, though this relationship was 
only modest in size (r = 0.56, p < 0.001). Our political ideology measure allows us to address 
two questions regarding robustness.  
First, how stable were our results across conceptually-related measures of the 
moderating variable? If the results did not arise solely due to chance, then they should 
replicate in new analyses replacing candidate support with political ideology. The new 
analyses replicated the modern sexism findings. We observed a significant interaction 
between survey time and political ideology on modern sexism, b = 0.02, SE = 0.01, t(2,286) = 
2.04, p = 0.042, 95% CI [0.001; 0.04]. Those on the conservative side of the scale (tested at 
+1SD) expressed significantly greater modern sexism post-election, b = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 
t(2,286) = 1.98, p = 0.047, 95% CI [0.001; 0.09], whereas those on the liberal side of the 
scale (tested at -1SD) did not, b = -0.02, SE = 0.02, t(2,286) = -0.90, p = 0.37, 95% CI [-0.07; 
0.03]. The indirect effects of survey time via modern sexism on the other measures were 
significant or (in one case) marginally significant among conservatives (see SOM). Thus, our 
findings on modern sexism hold when we use political ideology rather than candidate support 
as a moderator. 
By contrast, our findings on perceived discrimination against women were less robust. 
While political ideology marginally moderated the effect of survey time on perceived 
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discrimination against women, b = -0.05, SE = 0.03, t(2,286) = -1.86, p = 0.064, 95% CI [-
0.09; 0.003], survey time did not have a significant effect for either liberals, b = 0.07, SE = 
0.06, t(2,286) = 1.25, p = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.04; 0.19], or conservatives, b = -0.08, SE = 0.06, 
t(2,286) = -1.38, p = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.20; 0.03].  
A second question we can address with the political ideology measure is whether 
there is an effect of candidate support on our dependent variables above and beyond political 
ideology, or whether candidate support is just a proxy for political ideology. Suggesting our 
results can be attributed specifically to candidate support above and beyond political 
ideology, the survey time by candidate support interactions on modern sexism and perceived 
discrimination against women remained significant even after including political ideology as 
a covariate (see SOM).  
(2) Potential selection bias. Because different individuals participated before and 
after the election without random assignment, systematic differences in sample characteristics 
could have confounded our results. We tested whether any measured demographics differed 
between our pre- and post-election samples; socioeconomic status differed significantly, and 
education differed marginally. We addressed this issue in two ways (see SOM).  
First, we redid our main analyses controlling for each of these variables in turn, as 
well as for both variables simultaneously. None of the results previously reported changed 
meaningfully. Second, we used propensity score matching, a technique widely used in non-
experimental research to simultaneously correct for demographic differences between two 
samples. For Trump supporters, results revealed statistically indistinguishable demographics 
pre- versus post-election (ps ≥ 0.15), suggesting that the results reported above for Trump 
supporters are reliable. For Clinton supporters, results revealed potentially confounding 
demographic differences across pre- and post-election samples, but accounting for these 
differences produced similar results as above: Clinton supporters reported perceiving 
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marginally greater discrimination against women post-election. Thus, selection bias cannot 
account for the results. 
 (3) Multiple hypothesis testing. Recall that candidate support moderated the effects 
of survey time on two of six measures. Conducting the same moderation test on multiple 
measures raises the family-wise error rate (FWE) above α = 0.05. To quantify how much, we 
conducted the Bonferroni adjustment, which is the most well-known, and the Tukey-
Ciminera-Heyes (TCH) adjustment, which is designed for correlated measures like ours. The 
results delineate a range of possible FWEs because, in our situation, Bonferroni is too 
conservative and TCH is too liberal (Sankoh, Huque, & Dubey, 1997).   
 The survey wave by candidate support interaction on modern sexism remained 
significant or marginally significant after adjusting for multiple testing, α for FWE = 0.029 
(THC) to 0.072 (Bonferroni). Thus, this effect was robust.  
The survey wave by candidate support interaction on discrimination against women 
was non-significant or marginally significant after adjusting for multiple testing, α for FWE 
= 0.084 (THC) to 0.21 (Bonferroni). Thus, this effect was again less robust. 
Overall evaluation of robustness checks. To summarize, among Trump supporters, 
the effect of survey time on reported modern sexism was robust across four robustness 
checks, as were the indirect effects of survey time on other outcomes through modern sexism. 
These findings can thus be considered reliable. In contrast, among Clinton supporters, the 
effect of survey time on perceived discrimination against women was less robust, and thus 
cannot be deemed reliable (but see Does et al., in press). 
General Discussion 
Did Americans express different amounts of gender bias before versus after the 2016 
U.S. presidential election? Our findings suggest the answer may depend on which candidate 
they supported. Whereas Clinton supporters’ expressions of gender bias were not reliably 
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different post-election, Trump supporters showed a small but statistically significant increase 
in modern sexism post-election, which in turn predicted reporting lower disturbance with the 
gender pay gap, perceiving a lower prevalence of discrimination against women but more 
against men, perceiving greater progress towards gender equality, and reporting greater 
female representation at top levels of U.S. politics and organizations. These results were 
reliable across four robustness standards, thereby offering evidence that the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election outcome could have shaped gender-bias expression.  
Theoretical Implications 
To our knowledge, the present research represents the first large-sample, direct 
investigation of changes in gender-bias endorsement in the wake of a real-world historic 
event. Although the effects we observed could be considered small by traditional social 
psychology standards (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003), we suggest they are 
meaningful. Intergroup attitudes such as modern sexism are difficult to change (Clark, 
Wegener, Briñol, & Petty, 2009; Devine, 1989; Nosek et al., 2007), suggesting that even a 
small shift in their expression within 12 days could be theoretically important (Prentice & 
Miller, 1992).  
The present research also expands our understanding of what factors may influence 
gender-bias expression. By examining a one-time historic event, we move beyond the intra-
individual, interpersonal or cultural factors traditionally examined (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske & 
North, 2015; Glick et al., 2000; Swim et al., 2001). Additionally, whereas intergroup research 
has investigated the effects of political events signalling societal change (Columb & Plant, 
2011; Effron et al., 2009; Kaiser et al., 2009; Plant et al., 2009; Sawyer & Gampa, 2018; 
Skinner & Cheadle, 2016; Tankard & Paluck, 2017), the present work suggests that a 
political event signalling the confirmation of the gender status quo (i.e., the election of a male 
U.S. president) may shape intergroup attitude expression above and beyond self-reported 
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political ideology, at least among those who supported the winning candidate. Thus, these 
findings offer novel theoretical insights into the study of when people express gender bias.  
Potential Mechanisms  
Although the present results may have been driven in part by Donald Trump as an 
individual, other mechanisms – about which our data only allow us to speculate – may also 
have been at play. A first explanation is based on the idea that leaders rise to power because 
they best embody their ingroup prototype, and that followers change their attitudes to 
approximate this ingroup prototype (Hogg, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Knippenberg & 
Hogg, 2003). If Trump supporters interpreted Trump’s win as a validation of the ingroup 
prototype he showcased, they may have expressed greater modern sexism post-election to 
approximate his perceived positions on gender issues. By contrast, Clinton supporters’ gender 
attitudes may not have changed insofar as they did not perceive Trump as an ingroup 
prototype.  
A second possibility is that Trump’s election affected perceptions of social norms 
about gender bias. Research conducted concurrently to ours indeed found that explicit 
prejudice against groups negatively-targeted by Donald Trump’s campaign (e.g., Muslims) 
was perceived as more acceptable post-election (Crandall, Miller, & White, 2018) – although 
this research did not assess norms about gender bias broadly. Building on this perspective, 
given the accusations of sexism throughout the campaign, Trump’s election may have 
signalled to his supporters that gender equality is not a central concern among other Trump 
supporters. Consequently, they may have “tuned” their gender attitudes towards this 
perceived in-group norm and expressed greater modern sexism (Echterhoff, Higgins, & 
Levine, 2009; Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Clinton supporters would 
not engage in such “social tuning” (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001) because Trump’s 
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election did not inform them about the gender attitudes of other Clinton supporters – their 
reference group. 
A related possibility is that a shift in the perceived norms about gender bias did not 
actually affect Trump supporters’ attitudes per se, but rather increased their willingness to 
express attitudes they already had. People generally strive to inhibit themselves from 
expressing views that could seem prejudiced – unless they believe they can express such 
views without discrediting themselves (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Miller & Effron, 2010). 
Given Trump’s opposition to “political correctness” (Conway, Repke, & Houck, 2017), 
Trump supporters may have interpreted his election as a signal that expressing “politically 
incorrect” views about gender was no longer discrediting, and may thus have felt licensed 
post-election to voice gender-related attitudes that they previously kept private. For this 
explanation to fit our data, Trump supporters would have to be more likely than Clinton 
supporters to hold modern sexist views about gender pre-election, or to interpret the election 
as a license to express modern sexism. 
Finally, the observed shift in people’s perceptions of gender in society could reflect 
people’s motivation to justify the social and political systems in which they are embedded – 
particularly when these systems’ legitimacy is questioned (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & 
Hunyady, 2003, 2005; Kay et al., 2009). Trump supporters likely interpreted Trump’s 
election as a victory of the better candidate, rejecting allegations that America treated Clinton 
unfairly because of her gender. They may then have supported this interpretation by denying 
the existence of gender discrimination in the U.S. social and political system, dismissing 
women’s demands as illegitimate, and resenting them for asking for purported special favors 
– i.e., by endorsing modern sexism (Swim et al., 1995). In contrast, Clinton supporters may 
not have felt the same tendency to justify the system upon witnessing the defeat of a woman 
they presumably perceived as highly competent. 
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These different possibilities offer fruitful directions for future research using different 
sources of data, events, and facets of gender bias (e.g., ambivalent sexism; Glick & Fiske, 
1996) to determine the processes by which historic events may influence gender-bias 
expression.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Of course, this work has limitations. First, although previous research shows that 
gender-biased attitudes predict behavior (Fiske & North, 2015), the present study’s focus on 
attitudes cannot speak to whether the election outcome shaped gender-biased behavior (e.g., 
interpersonal interactions). Second, because it is impossible to experimentally manipulate 
one-time historic events, this work cannot draw causal conclusions about the effects of the 
election outcome on gender-bias expression, and should be considered suggestive until 
confirmatory work is conducted. However, the quasi-longitudinal nature of this study ensures 
that reverse causation is impossible, and the narrow time window during which the study was 
conducted minimizes the possibility that unmeasured variables may better explain the 
reported attitudinal shifts than the election outcome. Third, we recruited different participants 
pre- and post-election, which, unlike a longitudinal design, prevents us from examining 
whether gender-bias endorsement among the same participants increased post-election. 
However, compared to a longitudinal design, this study’s cross-sectional pre-/post-election 
design has the advantage of minimizing the risk of consistency bias and demand 
characteristics, and the propensity-score analysis reduces concerns that differences in the pre- 
and post-samples’ observed characteristics confounded our results. Despite these limitations, 
we suggest that exploratory correlational work, when taken as such and held to high 
standards of robustness, can meaningfully inform our understanding of whether and how 
historic events (e.g., elections) could influence intergroup attitudes. 
Conclusion 
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 This research informs a topical debate about whether the 2016 presidential election 
affected gender-bias expression in the U.S. Exploratory analyses suggest that Trump 
supporters, but not Clinton supporters, reported increased modern sexism post- versus pre-
election. This increase in turn predicted perceiving less discrimination against women but 
more against men, perceiving greater progress towards gender equality, believing more 
women occupy top levels of politics and organizations, and reporting less disturbance with 
the gender pay gap. Together, these results, which held against four robustness standards, 
emphasize the importance of considering historic events – not just individuals, dyads, groups, 
or cultures – for understanding the psychology of intergroup attitudes.  
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